The Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) officially designated foreign-manufactured power inverters and advanced robotic devices as national security hazards by including the two product categories on its Covered List. The FCC ruled all foreign-produced inverters carry unacceptable risks to U.S. national security, bringing supply chain fragility, cybersecurity loopholes and potential threats to American critical infrastructure.
The restriction exclusively targets newly imported inverters rather than equipment already purchased and deployed. The policy creates major headwinds for U.S. solar projects under development, as domestic inverter manufacturing capacity fails to meet national demand. To qualify as domestic compliant goods, inverters need a 65% domestic content threshold until 2028; the standard will rise to 75% thereafter. Inverters granted Conditional Approval by the U.S. Department of Defense (formerly Department of War) or Department of Homeland Security qualify for exemptions, requiring manufacturers to submit formal applications for inclusion on the approved roster.
The FCC emphasized that the country of manufacturing origin bears no weight in defining “foreign-produced” products. Reuters previously reported a planned ban targeting Chinese solar inverters, yet the final regulation applies universally to all overseas suppliers, with far broader coverage than initial market expectations. The FCC grounded its judgment on 2020 statistics showing merely 7% of U.S. inverter shipments stemmed from U.S.-headquartered manufacturers, while utility-scale solar inverter markets were dominated by foreign suppliers. While the Inflation Reduction Act has driven expansion of domestic inverter production capacity, PV Tech Research projects U.S. annual solar installation capacity will hit 40 GW by year-end, still falling short of the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 2026 utility-scale solar forecast.
Per the official National Security Determination document, heavy reliance on imported inverters creates systemic vulnerabilities. Remote connectivity functions enable bad actors to remotely shut down inverters, steal operational data, conduct surveillance or launch cyberattacks, with risks amplified amid rising inverter-based renewable resources across U.S. power grids. Notably, an early-2026 U.S. Department of Energy investigation found no evidence of malicious communication functions embedded within Chinese inverters.
FCC Chairman Brendan Carr voiced support for the federal interagency national security ruling, welcoming the inclusion of foreign inverters and advanced robotics on the FCC risk list. Industry observers note the U.S.
policy is markedly stricter than the European Union’s 2026 rule, which only bars EU public funding for solar projects using Chinese inverters. Wood Mackenzie analysis estimates the EU restriction will impact nearly 14% of Europe’s solar demand through 2030.
